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1. INTRODUCTION 
Right-wing populism (whatever that may mean, and I’ll get back to that later on) has dominated the news 
headlines over the last year or so. Whether it has been stopped, or halted, or has won, no one seems to 
know yet. Everyone does seem to agree that it is a force to be reckoned with. It’s a term linked with a 
decrease in trust among citizens in those who govern them. A term linked with a loss of resilience. And, 
especially in Europe, a term linked with nationalistic and anti-immigration rhetoric.   
 There has been quite some research into the populist attitudes of citizens (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2012; 
Oesch, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Akkerman et al., 2014). What are their backgrounds? What are their 
beliefs and political attitudes? At the same time, there has been an extensive research tradition into the 
political attitudes of public servants (a small and random sample: Aberbach & Rockman, 1976; Blais et 
al., 1991; Jensen et al., 2009; Rattsø & Sørensen, 2016; Bednarczuk, 2015). However, a cross-over 
study has not yet been conducted. Besides the typical gap-in-the-literature argument, why would this be 
a relevant cross-over to begin with? The political attitudes of public servants matter. They get orders 
from, and have to carry out the plans of, politicians. Sure. But they also have considerable room to shape 
decisions, policies and budget-allocations (for example through information asymmetries in their 
advantage). Especially in the NPM and post-NPM era, where the ‘let managers manage’ adage was 
based on the notion of autonomy. So what would or could the implications be of populist held attitudes 
among public servants? Do public servants trust the classic institutions the same amount as citizens? Or 
more? Or less? The same could be asked of their perception of their political influence as an individual. 
Or what he or she thinks about migration and refugees. And further: are there differences between 
countries on these issues? The research I present through this paper is a first, exploratory attempt to shed 
a light on these questions. Exploratory, as the data and methodology is not perfect, but, if you can 
forgive me, a valid attempt not the less.   
 The structure of this paper follows a somewhat straight-forward logic. First I will go into further detail 
on previous research, findings and models on the political attitude of public servants. Then I will introduce 
the academic debate and findings concerning the measurement of and research on populism. Both 
overviews will be non-exhaustive, but sufficient of the purpose of this paper. Third and fourth I will turn 
to the data and methodology, and the results of the statistical analysis. Finally these will be discussed 
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and the paper will be concluded, including suggestions for further research and the limitations of this 
paper.  
2. POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS 
Public servants are more left-leaning than non-public servants. Or are they? Research on the political 
attitudes of public servants dates back to the 1970s, and mostly points towards them having a more left-
leaning ideology (Jensen et al., 2009; Knutsen, 2005;  Garand et al., 1991; Bennett & Orzechowsky, 
1983; Blais et al., 1991; Wise & Szuecs, 1996). There are some notable exceptions, however (Park & 
Perry, 2013; Bednarczuk, 2015), that find American public servants to be more likely to vote Republican. 
Tepe (2012) finds that there is an important difference between public servants in public service sectors 
on the one hand (education, health care, etc.), and those working in the administration on the other. The 
latter are significantly more right-leaning than the former. Overall, however, the main findings for Europe 
are overwhelmingly in favor of the thesis that public servants are more left-leaning.  
 But why would they be more left-leaning? With a broad brush it’s possible to paint two pictures. The 
first to arrive on the scene is one rooted in rational-choice and public-choice theory. The so-called 
Bureaucratic Voting Model (BVM) considers public servants to be rational beings, who act and vote out 
of self-interest. Hence, as a public servant you want to maximize your budgets, and secure your job 
(Niskanen, 1971). The most logical thing from that perspective is to vote for a party that favors a large 
and growing role for the government and public sector. This would thus lead public servants to vote for 
left-wing parties, instead of right-wing parties, assuming that the latter prefer more market-based 
solutions.   
 A second model, focusses on the self-selecting effect of public servants’ values and intrinsic motivation 
to work in the public sector: public sector motivation (PSM). The self-selection argument entails that people 
choose the sector they want to work in, based on the values they hold, and where these values can come 
to fruition. It is argued that the public sector therefor attracts people who are more altruistic, more 
oriented towards working for ‘the common good’, and who are less interested in extrinsic rewards for 
their work (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Andersen et al., 2011; Vandenabeele, 2007; Steen, 2006). 
They have, in short, “a desire to serve the public interest, loyalty to duty and to the government as a 
whole, and social equity.” (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 369) It has been suggested in the past, that public 
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service motivation is linked to politics and policies (Perry, 1997), and it has indeed been found to 
correlate with political identity and ideology (Garand et al., 1991; Vandenabeele, 2011). 
Both arguments are based on strong conceptual footings, and have been investigated extensively. Both, 
however, focus on traditional left-right issues. The manner and measure in which the state should intervene 
in the economy. In the current political climate, it seems worthy to investigate how public servants score 
on certain non-economic themes. As right-wing populism rules the headlines in Europe, and in some cases 
the country, how do public servants view the issues it stands for? Based on the above, it would be logical 
to assume they differ (quite strongly, perhaps) from the median voter. But populist politics has been 
found to defy conventional political behavior theory and logic.  
3. POPULISM 
Populism is a three-headed beast. It can be a political strategy, ideology or a discursive style at the 
same time (Gidron & Bonikowsky, 2013). As a political strategy, it focusses on the organization of 
population mobilization, and the policy choices that are made in order to have a populist appeal 
(Acemoglu et al., 2011; Weyland, 2001). The discursive take on populism, in contrast, is mainly 
concerned with text and speech analysis of populist politicians. It focusses on the language that is used 
in order to paint a picture of moral good and bad, us and them, people and elite (Kazin, 1995; de la 
Torre, 2000). Finally, the third option, and focus of this paper, investigates populism as a political 
ideology. One of the most used definition from this perspective is the following: 
“[Populism is] a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of 
the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543, cited in Gidron & Bonikowsky, 2013) 
The ‘thin-centered ideology’ refers to the fact that populism does not have an elaborate, cohesive 
ideological background such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc. What they share is the idea 
of a corrupt elite vs. the pure masses, and a willingness to act as a megaphone for ‘the common 
man’ (Roberts, 2007). However, the lack of an underlying political ideology leads to a 
considerable variety of populist movements and parties. The American Tea Party is quite different 
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from the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). Alternative for Germany (AfD) is quite different from 
Chávez’s Socialist Party. This also shows that populism is not merely a phenomenon on the right-
wing of the political spectrum. Especially in South-America, the populist movement has also been 
considerably left-wing (Doyle, 2011; Baker & Greene, 2011). Considering the data I use in this 
paper, coming from European countries, the focus here lies on right-wing populism. 
Figure 1: Division and focus of populism as a concept 
 
As we have established what populism means as a political ideology, what exactly constitutes right-wing 
populism? First and foremost, although there is some overlap, it is important to distinguish it from the 
extreme right. Parties on this end of the spectrum are inherently anti-democratic and authoritarian 
(Mudde, 2000; Norris, 2005). Populism, on the other hand, strives to save democracy from the hands of 
the so-called corrupt elite. “Populists themselves argue that they are true democrats. After all, not only 
do they represent the people, they are also saving democracy from the corrupt elites and dangerous 
outsiders.” (Jacobs, 2010, p. 2) Politicians ought to return to the will of the people, often through different 
forms of direct democracy (Mudde, 2007).   
 So what are some of the characteristics that underlie the right-wing populist ideology? Alienation is 
a key word in the answer to this question. Many populist voters share a deeply rooted dissatisfaction 
with the way the current democracy works (Taggart, 1995; Oesch, 2008). They often feel as if their 
impact on politics is non-existent, and their trust in traditional institutions (parliament, the courts, political 
parties etc.) is very low (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004). Finally, anti-migration and cultural protectionist 
standpoints have been found to be the common denominator in explaining the electoral success of right-
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wing populist parties throughout Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). Economic grievances, although 
often used as an explanation in the media and by politicians, is consistently found to be less/not important 
in explaining populist votes.  
In the following analysis I will investigate whether or not public servants differ from the median voter 
when it comes to these populist attitudes. Based on the discussion about the political attitudes of public 
servants, I expect them  
1. to have more trust in public institutions (as they are an integral part of them, and place more trust in 
the state as a solution/problem solver),  
2. to be more satisfied with the way the democracy currently functions (again, since they are an integral 
part of it, and see it work up-close), 
3. to perceive their potential political influence as higher (once more, since they operate closely to the 
political processes, and because they have more trust in the receptiveness of political institutions), 
4. to have more ‘positive’ attitudes towards immigration at large, and refugees in particular (considering 
the altruistic and social motives underlying the idea of public service motivation). 
In short, I expect public servants to have less populist attitudes than the median voter. 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
The data for this investigation are retrieved from the European Social Survey. More specifically: round 
7 (2014/2015)1. The data from this round were limited for this research to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. I’ve chosen to 
focus on Northwestern-European countries in order to justify the comparisons between cases. This left me 
with 23,160 cases, divided between the eleven countries as follows:  
  
                                                 
1 The data, the questionnaire and the methodology of the ESS can be consulted at www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
or ESS (2014a). 
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Table 1: Respondents per country 
Country Respondents Country Respondents 
Austria 1795 The Netherlands 1,919 
Belgium 1769 Norway 1,436 
Denmark 1,502 Sweden 1,791 
France 1,917 Switzerland 1,532 
Germany 3,045 United Kingdom 2,264 
Ireland 2,390   
 
The differences between the number of cases between countries, between the populations of the 
countries, and the differences within countries of gathering respondents from certain remote regions, it is 
essential to use weights in the use of ESS data (ESS, 2014b). Design weight were used for within-country 
analysis, and population size weights were used for cross-country comparisons. The research design used 
here draws heavily on Van de Walle and Lahat (2016).  
 The sector of employment was measured through the question: ‘Which of the types of organization 
on this card do/did you work for?’ 
a. Central or local government 
b. Other public sector (such as education and health) 
c. A state-owned enterprise 
d. A private firm 
e. Self-employed 
f. Other 
Answers a, b and c were computed to constitute public servants, d, e and f were as non-public servants. 
 The respondents level of trust (between 0 (no trust) and 10(complete trust)) was asked separately in 
the survey for parliament, political parties, politicians, and the judicial system (excluding the police). 
Satisfaction with the current state of the democracy was asked in a similar fashion (between 0 (extremely 
dissatisfied) and 10 (extremely satisfied)). The respondents were asked to place themselves on the left-
right scale varying from 0 (left) to 10 (right). On the issues of refugees, the respondents were asked if 
they agreed with the statement that the government should be generous when accepting refugees into 
the country (0 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly)). Finally, views on immigration and the perception 
of political influence was asked through several questions. After a factor analysis the following two 
factors were established: 
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Table 2: Factors ‘views on immigration’ and ‘perception of influence’ 
Views on immigration Perception of influence 
Would you say that people who come to live here generally 
take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help 
to create new jobs? 
How much would you say that politicians care what people 
like you think? 
Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s 
economy that people come to live here from other countries? 
How much would you say the political system in [country] 
allows people like you to have a say in what the government 
does? 
Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally 
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from 
other countries? 
And how much would you say that the political system in 
[country] allows people like you to have an influence on 
politics? 
Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people 
coming to live here from other countries? 
 
 
The Cronbach alpha for ‘views on immigration’ and ‘perception of influence’ are respectively 0.8474 
and 0.8388. To control for differences between countries I use a two-way ANOVA including a Scheffe 
test, and checking for interaction effects between country and the sector of employment. Within countries 
I use a one-way ANOVA to investigate whether or not there are significant differences within between 
public servants and non-public servants. Finally, regressions are run for each of the dimension per country, 
controlling for age, gender, income and education.  
 Before turning to the results, it is worth explaining why I didn’t just measure the differences in voting 
for right-wing populist parties. This variable in the ESS data contains a large amount of ‘refusals’, a.k.a. 
voters who did not want to answer. There is a strong likelihood that these are not random. The differences 
are large between countries (e.g. 9.53% in Austria, 0.11% in Belgium, and 3.68% in Ireland), meaning 
that in some countries it is not considered sensitive or private to talk about ones political preference. 
Secondly, it is especially relevant with regards to right-wing populism. It can reasonably be argued that 
a disproportionate amount of the refusals are voters for the respective right-zing populist party 
considering the stigma that still surrounds these parties in some countries. This makes us end up with 
skewed, uncertain, and very small samples. Statistical analysis on these data is therefore rather 
problematic. 
5. RESULTS 
On the following pages the reader can find basic graphs depicting the mean scores on the different 
independent variables, divided between countries first, and public servants and non-public servants 
second. The two-way ANOVA’s showed that the differences between countries were significant on all 
the factors.  
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Figure 2: Trust in parliament 
 
Figure 3: Trust in legal system 
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Figure 4: Trust in political parties 
 
Figure 5: Trust in politicians 
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Figure 6: Satisfaction with democracy 
 
Figure 7: Views on immigration  
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Figure 8: Views on refugees 
 
Figure 9: Placement on left-right scale 
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Figures 2 through 9 show the differences between the two groups within each country, as well as between 
countries. Although the differences between countries are very interesting, analyzing and explaining 
these differences is not the goal of this paper. As mentioned before, the differences between the countries 
were found to be significant for each issue, and no interaction effects between countries and sector of 
employment were found. In every instance the public servants differ from the non-public servants as was 
expected. On average 
1. they trust parliament, the legal system, politicians, and political parties more, 
2. they are more satisfied with the current state of the democracy, 
3. they have more positive views on immigration and refugees, 
4. they perceive themselves to have more political influence, 
5. they place themselves more to the left on the left-right scale. 
The question remains, however, whether or not these differences are statistically significant or not. This 
question is answered per issue, and per country, in table 3 hereunder. In this table, red indicates that the 
difference is not statistically different. Green indicates that the difference found is statistically significant. 
In all cases the significant differences were marginal to small. This table shows us that the actual results 
are quite different from what was expected and assumed on the basis of figures 2 through 9.  
  First and foremost, we see a significant number of issues where the differences between public 
servants and non-public servants are not a straightforward. Secondly, there seems to be two types of 
populist attitudes: one where public servants largely differ from non-public servants (immigration, 
refugees, influence and left-right scale), and one where the picture is a lot messier (trust and satisfaction 
with democracy). Finally, there seems to be a great degree of difference between countries as to how 
comparable their body of public servants is to the general public. 
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Table 3: Overview of statistically (in)significant differences per country 
 AT BE DK FR DE IE NL NO SE  CH UK 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT2            
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM2            
TRUST IN POLITICIANS2            
TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES2            
SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY3            
VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION4            
VIEWS ON REFUGEES5            
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE6            
LEFT RIGHT SCALE7            
 
In the final step of the analysis I ran regressions for each of the dimensions per country. All were simple 
OLS regression, with the exception of ‘Views on refugees’, which was an ordinal logistic regression, given 
the ordinal nature of the question it is based on. The results are shown in table 4 through 12. * indicates 
a p-level of ≤ 0.05, ** ≤ 0.01 and *** ≤ 0.001. The control variables are also gathered through the 
ESS survey data. ‘Sector’ represents whether the respondent works in the public or private sector 
(reference category). ‘Age’ is the age of the respondent in years at the time of the survey. ‘Gender’ is 
categorized with men (0) as the reference category. ‘Education’ is considered an ordinal scale variable, 
consisting of the following possibilities: 
1. Less than lower secondary 
2. Lower secondary 
3. Lower tier upper secondary 
4. Upper tier upper secondary 
5. Advanced vocational, sub-degree 
6. Lower tertiary education, BA level 
7. Higher tertiary education, MA level 
‘Income’, finally, is a ten-step scale, interpreted as a continuous variable. The scale is formed around the 
national median yearly net income in the local currency, and thus differs per country. This makes the 
                                                 
2 Green = Public servants have higher trust than non-public servants. 
3 Green = Public servants are more satisfied with the current state of their respective democracies. 
4 Green = Public servants have more positive views on immigration and immigrants 
5 Green = Public servants have more positive views on refugees 
6 Green = Public servants have a more positive perception of their political influence 
7 Green = Public servants place themselves further to the left on the left-right-scale 
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relative income per person easier to compare between countries. An income of € 17.000,- in the 
Netherlands obviously represents something different than the same income in Greece.  
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Table 4: Regression results ‘trust in 
parliament’ 
 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT            
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,300   -0,020   0,081   0,148   0,101   0,202   
Age -0,001   -0,001   0,001   0,001   0,000   0,001   
Gender -0,097   -0,357 ** -0,510 *** -0,093   -0,389 *** -0,431 *** 
Education 0,353 *** 0,259 *** 0,382 *** 0,244 *** 0,195 *** 0,166 *** 
Income 0,004   0,024   0,064 ** 0,076 ** 0,130 *** 0,065 ** 
Constant 3,551 *** 3,770 *** 4,102 *** 2,440 *** 3,679 *** 2,946 *** 
N 1210   1428   1271   1589   2521   1644   
R² 0,0471   0,0547   0,111   0,0538   0,0687   0,0386   
 F = 0,000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000 F = 0,0000 F = 0,0000 
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,130   -0,029   0,228   0,187   -0,213     
Age -0,002   -0,002   -0,001   -0,005 ** 0,002     
Gender -0,115   -0,280 * -0,263 * 0,108   -0,397 ***   
Education 0,266 *** 0,253 *** 0,251 *** 0,131 *** 0,155 ***   
Income 0,120 *** 0,079 *** 0,094 *** 0,035   0,099 ***   
Constant 3,683 *** 5,398 *** 4,646 *** 5,629 *** 3,364 ***   
N 1590   1291   1536   1166   1.722     
R² 0,1228   0,0781   0,0775   0,0267   0,0472     
 F = 0,000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,000  F = 0,000  F = 0,0000   
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Table 5: Regression results ‘trust in 
legal system 
 
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM           
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,161   0,130   0,236   0,296 * 0,104   -0,003   
Age 0,000   -0,013 *** 0,008 * 0,000   -0,003 ** 0,000   
Gender 0,059   -0,183   -0,267 * 0,016   -0,406 *** -0,301 *** 
Education 0,281 *** 0,227 *** 0,251 *** 0,177 *** 0,206 *** 0,132 *** 
Income 0,036   0,020   0,077 *** 0,074 ** 0,128 *** 0,088 *** 
Constant 4,611 *** 4,520 *** 5,576 *** 3,949 *** 4,581 *** 4,503 *** 
N 1217   1433   1266   1604   2528   1660   
R² 0,0339   0,0503   0,0852   0,0366   0,0705   0,0318   
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,114   0,355 ** 0,259 * 0,096   -0,131     
Age -0,004 * -0,005   0,002   -0,005 * -0,001     
Gender -0,356 *** -0,253 * -0,330 ** -0,010   -0,322 **   
Education 0,296 *** 0,185 *** 0,175 *** 0,169 *** 0,130 **   
Income 0,095 *** 0,062 * 0,089 *** 0,084 *** 0,112 ***   
Constant 4,670 *** 6,291 *** 5,052 *** 5,710 *** 4,744 ***   
N 1591   1294   1539   1178   1.717     
R² 0,1343   0,0612   0,0561   0,0457   0,047     
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000    
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Table 6: Regression results ‘trust in political parties’ 
 
TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES          
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,098   -0,021   -0,055   0,198   -0,013   0,231   
Age 0,000   -0,006   0,001   0,001   -0,001   0,001   
Gender -0,266 * -0,121   -0,017   0,050   -0,091   -0,251 * 
Education 0,090 * 0,1571909 *** 0,233 *** 0,081 ** 0,094 *** 0,054   
Income 0,045   0,024   0,033   0,018   0,061 *** 0,052 * 
Constant 3,020 *** 3,580 *** 3,840 *** 2,105 *** 3,221 *** 2,781 *** 
N 1211   1431   1258   1602   2522   1659   
R² 0,0107   0,027   0,0475   0,0098   0,017   0,0134   
 F = 0,0235  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0077  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0005  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,103   -0,032   0,178   0,035   -0,076     
Age -0,001   -0,005   -0,003   -0,004 * 0,001     
Gender 0,276 ** 0,056   -0,143   0,263 * -0,081     
Education 0,193 *** 0,140 *** 0,201 *** -0,055   0,088 **   
Income 0,071 *** 0,053 ** 0,066 *** 0,068 ** 0,062 **   
Constant 3,579 *** 4,659 *** 3,964 *** 4,953 *** 2,810 ***   
N 1592   1286   1534   1160   1.719     
R² 0,0631   0,0338   0,0612   0,0173   0,0194     
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0012  F = 0,0000    
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Table 7: Regression results ‘trust in 
politicians 
 
TRUST IN POLITICIANS           
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,099   -0,071   0,094   0,279 * 0,050   0,292 * 
Age 0,002   0,000   0,004   0,004 ** 0,000   0,001   
Gender -0,196   -0,129   -0,014   0,028   -0,069   -0,336 ** 
Education 0,127 ** 0,227 *** 0,242 *** 0,129 *** 0,121 *** 0,075 * 
Income 0,047   0,034   0,060 ** 0,011   0,072 *** 0,073 ** 
Constant 2,800 *** 2,988 *** 3,301 *** 1,820 *** 2,972 *** 2,704 *** 
N 1215   1431   1265   1603   2526   1664   
R² 0,0125   0,0436   0,0625   0,023   0,0241   0,0236   
 F = 0,0096  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,076   -0,008   0,184   0,097   -0,184     
Age -0,002   -0,006 * -0,003   -0,003   0,002     
Gender 0,321 *** 0,082   -0,102   0,265 * 0,010     
Education 0,201 *** 0,151 *** 0,161 *** -0,006   0,098 ***   
Income 0,095 *** 0,063 ** 0,089 *** 0,020   0,085 ***   
Constant 3,471 *** 4,510 *** 3,848 *** 5,132 *** 2,540 ***   
N 1595   1291   1551   1176   1.727     
R² 0,0787   0,0416   0,056   0,0075   0,0271     
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000    
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Table 8: Regression results ‘satisfaction with democracy’ 
 
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY          
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,200   0,191   0,020   0,413 ** 0,208 * 0,210   
Age 0,004   0,003   0,003   0,002   0,002   0,001   
Gender 0,098   -0,298 ** -0,125   -0,086   -0,128   -0,470 *** 
Education 0,123 ** 0,192 *** 0,202 *** 0,205 *** 0,095 *** 0,120 *** 
Income 0,041   0,002   0,050 ** 0,116 *** 0,114 *** 0,154 *** 
Constant 4,515 *** 4,310 *** 5,862 *** 2,526 *** 4,785 *** 3,786 *** 
N 1212   1433   1265   1597   2526   1619   
R² 0,0113   0,0328   0,0423   0,065   0,0349   0,0601   
 F = 0,0174  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,194   0,047   0,042   0,234 * -0,053     
Age 0,000   -0,002   0,000   -0,002   0,001     
Gender -0,061   -0,058   -0,067   -0,162   -0,363 **   
Education 0,219 *** 0,112 *** 0,150 *** 0,042   0,139 ***   
Income 0,083 *** 0,041 * 0,089 *** 0,057 * 0,074 ***   
Constant 4,722 *** 6,638 *** 5,630 *** 6,956 *** 4,348 ***   
N 1578   1286   1536   1174   1.695     
R² 0,0847   0,0217   0,0441   0,0155   0,035     
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0027  F = 0,0000    
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Table 8: Regression results ‘vies 
on immigration’ 
 
VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION            
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector  -.2497576   .0834657   .2505225 * .3191604 ** .1555133 * .2287997   
Age -.0014753   .0004458   -.0011965   .0003505   -.0002065   .0009721   
Gender .0122698   -.3408931 *** .0118264   -.1871723 * -.1772136 *** -.3386896 *** 
Education .4763548 *** .2717305 *** .3824238 *** .3711236 *** .3342649 *** .3354203 *** 
Income .0092179   .0373874   .0256105   .0452026 * .0782509 *** .0451432 * 
Constant 2,936 *** 3,614 *** 3,611 *** 3,146 *** 3,922 *** 3,599 *** 
N 1231   1436   1273   1606   2536   1690   
R² 0,1317   0,1041   0,1663   0,1421   0,1428   0,1039   
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -.0005525   .0434134   .1633858   .1507505   .1922504     
Age .0014   -.0004787   -.0092848 *** -.0006576    -.0014851     
Gender -.0482575   -.0399695   .1240627   .006067   -.4413341 ***   
Education .230984 *** .2846317 *** .2922758 *** .2871894 *** .3250268 ***   
Income .0021096   .0491353 ** .0419577 ** .047491 * .0416247 *   
Constant 4,231 *** 4,213 *** 5,242 *** 4,298 *** 3,499 ***   
N 1599   1297   1555   1198   1.736     
R² 0,0956   0,1217   0,1365   0,1063   0,129     
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000    
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Table 10: Regression results 
‘views on refugees 
 
VIEWS ON REFUGEES            
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector 0,135   -0,329 ** -0,347 ** -0,332 *** -0,322 *** -0,271 ** 
Age -0,001   -0,003   0,008 ** -0,002 * 0,002   0,000   
Gender -0,186   0,098   -0,248 * -0,246 ** -0,088   -0,198 * 
Education -0,271 *** -0,102 *** -0,159 *** -0,114 *** -0,173 *** -0,063 * 
Income -0,045 * 0,029 * 0,013   0,039 * -0,023   0,019   
N 1208   1427   1261   1590   2519   1641   
 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² =  
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0004 
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,013   -0,296 ** -0,083   -0,118   -0,271 **   
Age -0,003   0,008 ** 0,000   0,000   -0,001     
Gender -0,024   -0,201   -0,275 ** -0,401 *** -0,036     
Education -0,108 *** -0,031   -0,194 *** -0,170 *** -0,137 ***   
Income 0,083 *** -0,010   0,017   0,012   -0,011     
N 1591   1290   1533   1187   1.723     
 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0002 
Prob > Chi² =  
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000 
Prob > Chi² = 
0,0000   
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Table 11: Regression results ‘views on political 
impact 
 
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL IMPACT          
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector 0,091   0,042   0,121   0,373 *** 0,152   0,314 ** 
Age -0,004 * -0,005   -0,008 * 0,000   -0,004 *** 0,000   
Gender -0,282 ** -0,256 * -0,267   -0,041   -0,202 ** -0,341 *** 
Education 0,286 *** 0,238 *** 0,370 *** 0,139 *** 0,242 *** 0,085 ** 
Income 0,060 ** 0,050 * 0,102 *** 0,042 * 0,109 *** 0,089 *** 
Constant 1,919 *** 2,552 *** 3,339 *** 2,017 *** 2,221 *** 2,420 *** 
N 1231   1.436   1273   1606   2536   1690   
R² 0,0817   0,077   0,1606   0,0399   0,0957   0,041   
 F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  
             
 NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
Variables Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
 -0,145   0,208   0,210   0,344 * 0,087     
Sector -0,002   -0,011 *** -0,016 *** -0,002   0,000     
Age 0,103   -0,094   -0,125   -0,371 ** -0,187     
Gender 0,298 *** 0,316 *** 0,294 *** 0,158 *** 0,150 ***   
Education 0,074 *** 0,093 *** 0,086 *** 0,102 *** 0,071 ***   
Income 2,883 *** 3,754 *** 3,770 *** 4,129 *** 2,624 ***   
Constant 1599   1297   1555   1198   1736     
N 0,1304   0,1435   0,1462      0,0525     
R² F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000  F = 0,0000    
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Table 12: Regression 
results ‘left right schale’ 
 
LEFT RIGHT SCALE            
 Country            
Variables AT (1)  BE (2)  DK (3)  FR (4)  DE (5)  IE (6)  
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. 
Sector -0,102   -0,397 *** -0,749 *** -0,594 *** -0,344 *** 0,251 * 
Age 0,002   0,006   0,006   0,000   0,003 ** 0,001   
Gender 0,012   -0,201   -0,216   -0,268 * -0,101   -0,117   
Education -0,212 *** 0,039   -0,159 *** -0,085   -0,108 *** -0,028   
Income 0,018   0,043   0,119 *** 0,071 ** 0,078 *** 0,046 * 
Constant 5,279 *** 4,541 *** 5,545 *** 5,208 *** 4,542 *** 4,961 *** 
N 1145   1.395   1238   1531   2470   1424   
R² 0,0374   0,0152   0,0605   0,0233   0,0277   0,0248   
 F = 0,0000  
F = 
0,0007  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0248  
             
Variables NL (7)  NO (8)  SE (9)  CH (10)  UK (11)    
 Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign. Coef. Sign.   
Sector -0,399 *** -0,822 *** -0,687 *** -0,271 * -0,528 ***   
Age 0,000   0,004   0,013 *** 0,003   0,003 *   
Gender -0,386 *** -0,207   -0,122   -0,646 *** -0,297 **   
Education -0,121 *** -0,051   0,056   -0,183 *** -0,065 *   
Income 0,154 *** 0,063 ** 0,154 *** 0,099 *** 0,105 ***   
Constant 5,024 *** 5,462 *** 3,490 *** 5,515 *** 4,861 ***   
N 1531   1272   1514   1134   1588     
R² 0,0661   0,0533   0,0618   0,0571   0,0491     
 F = 0,0000  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0000  
F = 
0,0000    
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The results from the regression analysis show that many of the explanatory value of sector of employment 
vanishes in many instances when there are controls for gender, age, education and income. With regards 
to trust and satisfaction with democracy, ‘sector’ is non-significant for trust in parliament and political 
parties. Trust in the legal system is only significantly explained by the sector of employment in France, 
Sweden and Norway. Only in France and Ireland do public servants have more trust in politicians than 
non-public servants do. The satisfaction with democracy is significantly higher among public servants in 
Switzerland, France and Denmark. Although the ANOVA-tests earlier on found highly diverse outcomes 
between countries on these issues, the results from the regression analyses are a lot more unambiguous: 
sector of employment, with a few exceptions, does not seem to matter in explaining the trust in institutions 
and satisfaction with democracy as it currently functions.  
 The ANOVA-tests showed a clear break on the issues of migration, refugees and perception of 
political influence. It was expected that the regression analysis would show the clearest influence of 
employment sector on these issues on the basis of the ANOVA results. Danish, German and French public 
servants showed significantly more positive views on immigration than non-public servants. Regarding 
views on refugees, the results were more in line with expectations. Only in Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Austria did the sector of employment not contribute to the explanation of the views of 
the respondent with regards to the way refugees should be treated. The Perception of political influence, 
furthermore, shows to be significantly more positive among public servants in France, Switzerland an 
Ireland, compared with non-public servants. Finally, the placing on the left-right scale was significantly 
more to the left for public-servants in all countries but Austria. The model for Ireland was not statistically 
significant with F = 0,0248. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I investigated the populist attitudes of public servants in comparison to non-public servants. 
The previous findings on the political attitudes of public servants (usually more left-wing than non-public 
servants), the fact that they work within the system itself and the concept of public service motivation 
caused me to expect they would have more trust in and satisfaction with democratic institutions. This 
turned out not to be the case. Only in a few countries were the trust-levels in institutions and levels of 
satisfaction with the democracy different between public servants and non-public servants. The same 
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picture was drawn for vies on immigration and the perception of political influence. Only on the views 
of refugees and the placement on the left-right scale was the difference between the two sectors of 
employment significant in a more (but not perfectly) consistent fashion across countries.   
 The overall conclusion might be that public servants do not differ significantly from non-public servants 
in their populist attitudes, with the possible exception of views on refugees, and several exceptions 
between countries on the other variables. The findings from previous private-public cleavage literature 
and public service motivation literature can thus not simply by extended to the topic of populism. France 
is a notable case to pick out, however, since the French public servants were the only ones to continuously 
differ from non-public servants in the way that was expected. Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden were 
three other countries that returned multiple times, but not nearly as consistent as France. The way in which 
public servants are recruited differ strongly per country, and the way in which this is done perhaps 
influences the populist attitudes that are recruited.   
 To be clear, I did not measure populism. So, the conclusion can’t be that public servants are just as 
populist as non-public servants. As discussed earlier in the methodology section, the measurement of 
populism is not possible with ESS data. This study therefor one of an exploratory nature. Further research 
should investigate the populist attitudes using for example the measurement instruments used by 
Akkerman et al. (2014). A second limitation is the fact that some of the significant differences found in 
the regression can be discussed. With the type of population sizes as gathered through the ESS, 
significance levels of 0.05, or even 0.01 are not very strong. Considering the exploratory nature of this 
study, however, they are still highly interesting to note.   
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